Excerpt from Exploration Proposal:
I think I really could definitely admit if your personality had been completely changed, then one might cease to function as a similar identity and would rather be someone new, even in the same body. And – to head you off ahead of you ask – yes, I believe the invert is also the case: the same individuality (that is usually, the same mind) transferred to a new body system would retain the same identification that acquired previously busy the original physique.
BOB: At this point you’ve challenging things – is identification of the character or the head? Or may be the mind it of the individuality, and also identification? In our initial supposition of 1 who endures a trauma and undergoes a personality modify, suppose that the memory space is not affected. Would identity have changed here, even though the two personas share a consistent history?
CIN: Yes, I do believe that would be a fair assessment – if a single perceives the world differently, and interacts with the earth differently (and after all, precisely what is personality but perception and interaction? ) than they will used to, then it would be reasonable to say that one had improved identities.
JOE: Then in the event that you where (fortune forbid) to undergo a personality-changing trauma that resulted in your storage completely unchanged, you would not consider yourself you?
CIN: No .
BOB: So you would have memories of having been another person, but probably would not actually be precisely the same person – thus two identities could have occupied the body at distinct times? I realize you wait, which makes myself glad, intended for though I do not wish to think that each of our identity can be tied solely to our bodies, there is certainly more to this question than simply what lies beneath the surface area. Let’s find; so far we have established that identity can be not totally dependent on the physical human body, and yet is at some techniques attached to that – namely, we have learned that the personality is easily-removed from the physique, but the inverse of this can be not true. Until now, however , the discussion ahs been limited to ideas of discrete identities existing within just discrete systems, but what of multiple coexisting identities in one body, or maybe a single identity in multiple bodies?
CIN: Would it amaze you to notice that I avoid quite stick to you?
GREG: I avoid even find out where I’m going; it undoubtedly wouldn’t end up being wise to stick to me. But at least play along – assume your mind was somehow expected into two different bodies, neither certainly one of which was one you right now occupy. Might either of those two bodies be you? Or will they become new identities? Or will they the two be you? Could that they both become you?
CIN:…. well, not necessarily you gonna answer?
JOE: I’m certainly not sure myself. But since we have decided that personality can be removed via he body, though not the other way around, it seems reasonable to assume that at least one of the new bodies could be an file format of your own personality.
CIN: And the other body system?
BOB: For now, I would declare at the moment of conception, mainly because it were – that is, right now when your mind/personality was transferred to these two new bodies – at this incredibly precise moment than yes, the two identities were both equally you. And from this instant forward, not identity was you, but instead a distinct personality with a shared set of remembrances to a certain stage, and persistent history thereafter.
CIN: When, when I declared memory had not been really a component to identity, you said
GREG: Yes, I know what I explained. Unfortunately, I’m on my way into a movie and can’t actually stop to dispute with you anymore. Besides, increased minds than ours include tackled this same problem (in far more sophisticated ways), as well as the issue nonetheless isn’t solved. I just currently taking comfort in with the knowledge that I’m myself right now – though I suppose I might have got a transformative experience inside the cinema.
CIN: If you don’t undergo an unexpected brain trauma first…
BOB: That which was that?
CIN: Oh nothing.