Download now
DANIEL BERGSTRESSER LAUREN COHEN RANDOLPH COHEN CHRISTOPHER MALLOY The DELTA approach was impressive in two ways.
First, with regards to its framework, AQR applied the actual strategies by using a well-defined expenditure process, with the goal of delivering contact with a well-diversified portfolio of hedge finance strategies. Second, in terms of it is fees, the modern DELTA strategy charged fairly lower charges: 1 percent management fees additionally 10 percent of performance more than a cash hurdle (or, additionally, a management fee of 2 percent only). This charge structure was low relative to the market, where 2 percent administration fees as well as 20 percent of performance, generally with no difficulty, was normal.
These features, while distinctive relative to similar hedge pay for replication items, had yet to fully speak out loud with buyers, and Kabiller needed to make a decision on a more successful marketing procedure given the top number of competition entering this kind of space. Instructors Daniel Bergstresser (HBS), Lauren Cohen (HBS), Randolph Cohen (MIT), and Christopher Malloy (HBS) ready this case. HBS cases happen to be developed exclusively as the basis for discussion in the classroom. Cases aren’t intended to serve as endorsements, types of primary info, or drawings of successful or useless management.
Copyright laws 2011, 2012 Director and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce components, call 1-800-5457685, write Harvard Business University Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or head to www.hbsp.harvard.edu/educators. This kind of publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or perhaps transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Organization School.
212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Hedge funds Voor- en nadelen Hedge Account: While open-end mutual money had to signup with the SEC, calculate and publish daily net asset values (NAVs), and provide traders with daily liquidity, hedge funds weren’t automatically regulated by the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S and appreciated as much overall flexibility as they could negotiate with the clients with respect to liquidity. In exchange for this light-touch regulation, hedge funds were restricted within their marketing: simply high net worth and institutional investors could directly invest in these funds.
Nevertheless, academic operate had by late nineties established that hedge money offered a risk publicity that was less correlated with broad industry indexes than most common funds, and potentially provided high risk-adjusted returns. The performance of the hedge finance industry during the 2001-2002 economic downturn was particularly very good; Exhibit 1 shows that although stock market indices (S&P and NASDAQ) droped dramatically during this period, broad hedge fund directories (e. g., DJCS_Hedge and HFRI_FW, which were designed to track the overall overall performance of the hedge fund industry) rose.
In response to the notion that hedge funds truly offered outperformance, institutional funds flowed in to hedge cash during the later 1990s and 2000s, and the size of the industry grew rapidly. Exhibit 2 charts the growth inside the number of funds and total AUM (assets under management) in the hedge fund market since 1997. With this progress in assets and managers, questions started to surface about the part of hedge funds in a portfolio and whether there were other ways to capture those returns without being exposed to a number of the negatives of hedge fund investing. Most funds likewise had a bare minimum investment size of at least $1 million.
In addition , many traders found the fees incurred by hedge funds, which regularly amounted to 2% of assets underneath management (some funds possibly charged the complete cost of all their operations with their funds, amounting to much more than 2% management fees) plus an additional twenty percent of profits generated by the fund, to become excessive and hoped to acquire similar rewards at a lower cost. Several investors also available the idea of picking out a portfolio in the many thousands of accessible hedge money to be a great intimidating process, especially presented the lack of visibility (both regarding investment procedure and holdings) that was common amongst hedge account managers.
As well as even if an investor can identify some funds that made up a stunning portfolio, the managers of people funds may not accept a great investment at that time or perhaps from that buyer. Finally, in contrast to the common fund market, there was deficiencies in established benchmarks for hedge funds, rendering it difficult to examine skill compared to luck and idiosyncratic compared to systematic comes back. While hedge fund directories existed, just read was just peer groups, incorrect benchmarks, and were biased by a quantity of things, including style drift and survivorship bias.
In response to these criticisms, alternative goods were shortly introduced in to the marketplace. two AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 onerous= burdensome/ heavy This method solved many of the issues facing hedge account investors, individuals with moderate capital. FOFs had fewer onerous liquidity rules than individual hedge funds, and FOFs had been less likely to encounter liquidity complications than specific funds given that they could get liquidity by a number of actual funds. Still, FOFs were ultimately controlled by the underlying liquidity (both with respect to liquidity terms and underlying holdings) of the money they were buying.
In addition , a single minimum expenditure bought a portfolio of many funds, and a professional and ideally expert monetary professional, or team of such experts, selected the funds, and chose allocations among them that (presumably) made a well-optimized portfolio. Finally, FOF managers claimed that all their experience and connections offered access to hard-to-enter funds. Hence FOFs presented an appealing package deal, and indeed near half of almost all money committed to hedge cash came through FOFs.
However , a large number of investors were put off simply by FOF service fees, which traditionally included one more layer of fees frequently high since half the level of hedge account fees themselves (thus making total costs paid about 1 . five times higher than to get direct investing). A second potential advantage of multi-strategy funds was in portfolio development. Not only was your allocation amongst strategies performed by pros, those professionals likely a new high level of insight and visibility in to the opportunities offered to the individual posito managers.
Multi-strategy funds generally offered as good or better liquidity than individual-strategy money, and of course there is no trouble increasing access for the underlying managers. Multi-strategy money appeared to present strong diversity, although inside the famous circumstance of the hedge fund Amaranth, investors believed they were purchasing a diversified stock portfolio of tactics. However , serious losses with the portfolio’s succursale led to the losing of approximately 74% of total portfolio value.
Consequently a large number of investors sensed they were not really truly diversified if they had a large allocation into a multi-strategy finance, but this can be potentially mitigated through the correct quantity of transparency into the positions and risks from the portfolio, or, of course , through diversification among several different multi-strategy funds, thereby minimizing single firm risk. silos= opslagplaatsen 3 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 1 potential concern with multi-strategy funds from the investor’s point of view was the question of portfolio director quality. Though it was possible that a single firm could accumulate under one roof the most beneficial managers in several specialties, a few investors discovered this implausible.
These top-down approaches aimed to use statistical methods to make a portfolio of liquid assets that had similar performance to hedge cash as a category. One top-down approach was going to use thready regressions, or optimizations, to make a stock portfolio that experienced high correlations to historical hedge fund returns. One of this approach contains three steps. Former would get a long-run period series of results on a diversified portfolio of hedge funds (e. g., the HFRI monthly hedge fund indices were typically used).
The other would obtain returns on a large number of the liquid investments-these could possibly be indexes of stocks (e. g., S&P, MSCI EAFE, MSCI Appearing, Russell 2000, and so forth ), a genuine (e. g., US 10-year government bonds), currencies (e. g., EUR-USD Spot Exchange Rate), and so forth () Finally, one would use a standard record optimizer, or linear regression, to find the profile of liquid investments (either long or short with weights implied by the statistical analysis) that a majority of closely duplicated the record characteristics of the hedge finance portfolio. Show 3 reveals the monthly returns coming from a set of directories that were frequently used for hedge fund replication purposes. you Specifically, the goal was to create a portfolio that in the past moved as close to one for one together with the hedge fund portfolio, in order that it had large correlation with the hedge fund portfolio, yet also matched up other statistical moments, such as unpredictability, skewness, and kurtosis.
Historically, and ideally on a forward-looking basis too, this stock portfolio would satisfy a role inside the diversified portfolio similar to the role that hedge funds might play. Demonstrate 4 plots the the latest return performance of a few commonly used hedge account indices (e. g., DJCS_Hedge, HFRI_FW, and HFRX_Global), which represent composite indices of individual hedge funds and were made to track the complete return overall performance of the market; as well as a fund-ofhedge funds (FOF) index (HFRI_FOF) designed to monitor the overall come back performance of funds of hedge funds. Exhibit your five presents the return overall performance of four well-known hedge fund replication index products, created by Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Credit Suisse.
Display 6 gives the come back performance of the overall hedge fund directories alongside the performance of such hedge fund replication goods. 1 This is an excerpt of the info. The full info series is in the Spreadsheet Product to the case.
4 AQR’s DELTA Technique 212-038 Commonly upon the announcement from the merger, the price of the target stocks would not climb all the way to the purchase price that would be appropriate if the merger were sure to be accomplished. When Mitchell and Pulvino studied the merger accommodement industry, they will found that merger arbitrage strategies performed deliver considerable risk-adjusted results.
Specifically, the expected results of adding merger arbitrage investments into place was substantial, and while the chance was higher than one may well naturally have got expected because mergers tended in order to up specifically at times of market tension, and therefore the merger arbitrage technique had even more beta, or market exposure, than could possibly be presumed nevertheless they will found that even accounting for this risk, the performance of a naГЇve merger arbitrage strategy that invested in every single deal was substantial. Mitchell and Pulvino also viewed the efficiency of genuine merger arbitrage funds.
A merger arbitrage fund would be expected to put alpha by correctly figuring out which mergers were approximately likely to obtain completion than the market anticipated. So , for instance , if the industry pricing of your deal was such that the expected come back would be absolutely no if the merger was 90% likely to be completed, the combination arbitrageur’s task was to try to figure out if in fact the merger was substantially much more than 90% prone to go through, significantly less than 90%, or about 90%, and then invest just in all those deals that have been substantially much more than 90% prone to go through.
What Mitchell and Pulvino found was that merger arbitrage money made money, but that they did not show an capability to forecast which mergers could close over and above the market’s ability. That is certainly, the outperformance that combination arbitrageurs were generating was not a greater than the outperformance that could be generated with a simple technique that bought every goal and shorted every prospective buyer, particularly net of charges. 5 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy This kind of opened the doorway to a potential strategy for the replication of merger arbitrage: simply take part in every merger arbitrage package that met a set of basic screens (e. g., size and liquidity).
The benefit to investors might be a potentially even more diversified portfolio of merger deals than would be obtained from a fund manager who also only picked a part of the offers, and also probably far lower costs, because there was not a need to pay an analyst to identify which mergers were basically likely to be successful. With this as a design template, one could quickly imagine a complete roster of potential hedge fund tactics that could be captured in a organized way (e. g., lengthy value stocks and options and short growth stocks and options, convertible arbitrage, carry trades, trend pursuing trades and trades exploiting other famed empirical property pricing anomalies).
Since the early on work into merger accommodement, AQR got spent years researching the other classical hedge fund strategies that could be captured from the bottomup. Finally and perhaps most importantly, AQR felt the fact that hedge fund indices upon which most top-down replication tactics were based a new variety of biases (e. g., survivorship bias), had excessive exposure to traditional markets (i. e., collateral and credit rating beta) and in addition tended to reflect the amount of weight of the most well-liked strategies. As these well-liked strategies were crowded with many trades, the expected earnings on these kinds of strategies going forward were potentially lower.
To put it briefly, while they will shared the noble goals of top-down replication products (i. electronic., attempting to provide liquid, transparent exposure to hedge fund strategies at a lower fee), AQR felt the fact that approach experienced fundamental defects or, as Cliff Asness put it within a speech in October 2007 on hedge fund duplication, Not Anything that Can Be Done Should Be Done. insular = bekrompen 6 AQR’s DELTA Approach 212-038 a great Emerging Marketplaces strategy, a Long/Short equity strategy, a Dedicated Short Tendency strategy, a great Equity Marketplace Neutral technique, a Descapotable Arbitrage technique, and an Event Driven technique. Given that overall performance fees were typically just paid on returns around a funds hurdle, was obviously a twenty percent efficiency fee really that expensive to fund buyers?
Related considerations applied to investors that put in primarily through Funds of Hedge Cash. These purchase vehicles commonly added a layer of fees along with the after-fee performance with their hedge pay for investments typically a single percent administration fee and a ten percent performance fee. Due to DELTA’s multi-strategy expense approach, its after-fee efficiency should maybe be benchmarked against those of fund-of-funds alternatives.
Conveying to such buyers the cost advantage of DELTA in simple terms for instance, simply how much better their particular competitors’ pre-fee returns needed to be than those of DELTA to offset the fee differential box would go a long way in convincing them that DELTA was the excellent approach. A second challenge in marketing DELTA was the beginning of the apparent hedge finance replication strategies. These strategies were nearly the polar opposite of the fund-of-funds they had simple fees and, because they will replicated hedge fund comes back using highly liquid indices, they confronted little in the form of liquidity risk.
Institutional shareholders interested in low-fee exposure to hedge fund earnings found the products attractive, and Kabiller identified it tough to convey the benefits of the DELTA approach. His inclination was to focus on two key limits of hedge fund replication. First, he felt that they relied intensely on the historic relationship between hedge fund returns and major stock and relationship market indices. To the extent that the romance was not secure, 7 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy or to the level that a significant fraction of hedge finance movements could not be captured by a suitable combination of these kinds of indices, the replication strategy would be limited in its capacity to truly deliver in real time the actual returns staying earned by the average hedge fund trader.
Second, set up strategy can replicate a large fraction of the monthly fluctuations in performance of the average hedge fund, Kabiller felt it absolutely was likely that a top-down procedure would be limited in replicating the actual edge, or alpha, of the average hedge fund. Regardless if much of the dangers to which hedge funds had been exposed could be found in extensive stock and bond market indices, it was unlikely that any of the informational or fluid edges that they possessed would appear in the comes back of these indices. A final problem Kabiller faced in the marketing of DELTA was it is track record.
Though it had outpaced the wide-ranging HFRI index since its invention in the fall of 2008, the background was still a fairly limited a single. Moreover, since the central appeal of the product was its capability to match normal hedge pay for returns with moderate fees, the outperformance as luck would have it posed something of a concern for DELTA. Kabiller believed it would be important to understand their source prior to determining if it was a great aberration or whether they possessed a lasting edge relative to the index of hedge funds. While Kabiller seemed out past his infinity pool and into the relaxed waters from the Long Island Audio, he bothered that without a proper knowledge of these problems, many rough sales meetings lay forward for him and his DELTA team.
8 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit one particular Cumulative Returning Performance of Hedge Pay for Indices vs . Stock Market Indices, since 1996. Cumulative Return Efficiency of Hedge Fund Directories Versus Stock exchange Indices five-hundred Source: Bloomberg. 9 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy almost eight, 000 $1, 500. 00 6, 000 $1, 500.
00 four, 000 500 usd. 00 Hedge Fund AUM (in Great $) $2, 000. 00 Number of Hedge Funds Hedge Fund AUM 2, 1000 1997 98 1999 2150 2001 2002 2003 2005 2005 2006 2007 08 2009 2010 $- Source: Created by simply casewriters applying data via Hedge Fund Research, www.hedgefundresearch.com, accessed Aug 2011.
10 212-038 -11- HFRI HFRI FOF HFRI FW 1/31/1996 1 . 1% 2 . seven percent 2 . 9% 2/29/1996 3/29/1996 2 . 8% 1 . 9% -0. 6% 1 . 0% 1 . 2% 1 . 5% 4/30/1996 5/31/1996 5. 3% 3. 7% 3. 1% 1 . 5% 4. 0% 3. 1% 6/28/1996 7/31/1996 8/30/1996 -0. 7% -2. 9% 2 . 6% 0. 4% -1.
9% 1 ) 5% zero. 2% -2. 1% installment payments on your 3% 9/30/1996 10/31/1996 installment payments on your 2% 1 . 6% 1 ) 2% 1 ) 6% installment payments on your 1% 1 ) 0% 11/29/1996 12/31/1996 1 . seven percent 0. 8% 2 . 3% 0. seven percent 2 . 1% 1 ) 3% 1/31/2011 2/28/2011 0. 4% 1 . 3% 0. 1% 0. 8% 0. 4% 1 . 2% 3/31/2011 4/29/2011 0. 5% 1 . 3% -0. 1% 1 . 2% 0. 1% 1 . 5% 5/31/2011 6/30/2011 7/29/2011 -1.
3% -1. 3% -0. 3% -1. 1% -1. 3% 0. 4% -1. 2% -1. 2% zero. 2% 8/31/2011 9/30/2011 -4. 9% -6. 0% -2. 6% -2. 8% -3. 2% -3. 9% 10/31/2011 11/30/2011 12/30/2011 4. 9% -2. 0% -0. 9% 1 . 1% -1. 0% -0. 4% 2 . 7% -1. 3% -0. 4% 1/31/2012 three or more. 8% 1 ) 9% 2 . 6% Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Display 4 Total Return Efficiency of General Hedge Pay for Indices, as June 3 years ago. Source: Bloomberg. 12 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit 5 Cumulative Return Overall performance of Hedge Fund Duplication Indices, since June 3 years ago. Source: Bloomberg. 13 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Strategy Exhibit 6 Comparison of Cumulative Return Performance of Overall Hedge Fund Directories versus Hedge Fund Replication Indices, since June 3 years ago.
Comparison of Latest Performance of Hedge Fund Indices Vs . Hedge Fund Replication Products 130 120 110 95 90 80 70 62 200706 200708 200710 200712 200802 200804 200806 200808 200810 200812 200902 200904 200906 200908 200910 200912 201002 201004 201006 201008 201010 201012 201102 201104 201106 DJCS_Hedge HFRI_FW HFRX_Global HFRI_FOF ML GS JPM CS Resource: Bloomberg. 18 AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit several Monthly Come back Performance of AQR DELTA strategy, Seeing that Inception. 12-15 212-038 AQR’s DELTA Technique Exhibit eight Monthly Go back Performance (and Beta) of AQR DELTA strategy in comparison to Market Indices (S&P, NASDAQ) and Hedge Fund Directories (DJCS_Hedge, HFRI_FW), since March 2008.
Date 200810 200811 200812 200901 200902 200903 200904 200905 200906 200907 200908 200909 200910 200911 200912 201001 201002 201003 201004 201005 201006 201007 201008 201009 201010 201011 201012 201101 201102 201103 201104 201105 Average DELTA 1 . 22% 1 . 72% 4. 05% 2 . 79% -0. 10% 2 . 32% 3. 09% -0. 35% 1 . 78% 1 . 93% 4. 48% 2 . 70% -0. 31% 0. 96% 0. 57% -0. 66% -0.
27% 2 . 23% 2 . 18% -3. 37% 1 . 39% 1 . 62% 2 . 02% 3. 33% 2 . 47% 1 . 03% 1 . 93% -0. 41% -0. 45% 0. 92% 2 . 31% -0. 84% 1 . 32% S&P_Index -16. 94% -7. 48% zero. 78% -8. 57% -10. 99% eight. 54% 9. 39% 5. 31% zero. 02% 7. 41% three or more. 36% a few. 57% -1. 98% a few. 74% 1 . 78% -3. 70% installment payments on your 85% five. 88% 1 . 48% -8. 20% -5. 39% 6. 88% -4. 74% eight. 76% three or more. 69% -0. 23% six. 53% 2 . 26% a few. 20% -0. 10% 2 . 85% -1. 35% zero. 64% 0. 09 zero. 28 0. 32 DJCS_Hedge -6. 30% -4. 15% -0. 03% 1 . 09% -0. 88% 0. 65% 1 . 68% 4. 06% 0. 43% 2 . 54% 1 . 53% 3. 04% 0. 13% 2 . 11% 0. 88% 0. 17% 0. 68% 2 . 22% 1 . 24% -2. 76% -0. 84% 1 . 59% 0. 23% 3. 43% 1 . 92% -0. 18% 2 . 90% 0. 69% 1 . 38% 0. 12% 1 . 80% -0. 96% 0. 64% 0. 25 HFRI_FW -6. 84% -2. 67% 0. 15% -0.
09% -1. 21% 1 . 66% 3. 60% a few. 15% zero. 25% 2 . 50% 1 ) 30% installment payments on your 79% -0. 20% 1 ) 52% 1 . 28% -0. 76% zero. 66% installment payments on your 49% 1 ) 19% -2. 89% -0. 95% 1 ) 61% -0. 13% a few. 48% 2 . 14% zero. 19% installment payments on your 95% zero. 41% 1 . 23% zero. 06% 1 . 45% -1.
18% 0. 66% 0. 25 DELTA’s Beta with: DJCS_Hedge’s Beta with: HFRI_FW’s Beta with: Source: Organization documents. sixteen AQR’s DELTA Strategy 212-038 Exhibit being unfaithful Cumulative Return Performance of AQR DELTA Strategy vs . Market Directories (S&P and NASDAQ) and Hedge Fund Indices (DJCS_Hedge and HFRI_FW), since August 2008 Cumulative Return Performance of DELTA versus Market and Hedge Fund Indices 180 DELTA NASDAQ S&P_Index DJCS_Hedge HFRI_FW Source: Bloomberg and company documents. seventeen 212-038 -18- Exhibit 15 Annual Returns of Largest Hedge Cash (%) Finance Name Winton Futures UNITED STATES DOLLAR Cls B Millennium Foreign Ltd Transtrend DTP Enhanced Risk (USD) The Genesis Rising Mkts Invt Com A Element Diversified Programme Aurora Just offshore Fund Ltd. Permal Macro Holdings Ltd USD A Canyon Benefit Realization Cayman Ltd A Permal Fixed Income Holdings NV CHF A Absolute Alpha Pay for PCC Diversified Caxton Global Investments Ltd GAM U. S. Institutional Trading K4D-10V Portfolio K4D-15V Portfolio Orbis Optimal (US$) Fund GAM Trading 2 USD Open Double Black Diamond Ltd (Carlson) GoldenTree High Produce Master Account Ltd Bay Resource Lovers Offshore Finance Ltd GAM U. S. Institutional Diversity Firm Identity Winton Capital Management Millennium Intl.
Management Transtrend VAGINOSIS Genesis Expense Management Element Capital Aurora Investment Supervision Permal Property Management Canyon Capital Advisors Permal Advantage Management Economic Risk Management Caxton Associates GAM Sterling Administration Graham Capital Management Graham Capital Administration Orbis Purchase Management GAM Sterling Management Carlson Capital Goldentree Advantage Management GMT (GREENWICH MEAN TIME) Capital Corp GAM Sterling Management 2001 7. eleven 15. 26 26. thirty six 4. sixty two 15. seventy nine 9. 82 14. sixty six 12. 69 11.
55 9. 33 31. 41 16. thirty four 6. 45 39. 23 29. 01 14. 80 11. 94 18. 35 29. 32 9. 56 2002 18. 34 9. 61 26. 26 -1. 77 19. 19 1 ) 31 eight. 03 your five. 21 12. 47 six. 36 twenty six. 44 12. 69 18. 76 43. 71 doze. 15 15. 55 installment payments on your 12 six. 24 zero. 03 some. 95 2003 27. seventy five 10. 89 8. 48 61. 98 20. fifty nine 13. fifty eight 12. 56 21. 87 17. 59 8. 07 8. 09 14. seventy four 8. 46 21. 70 10. 84 14. 49 7. sixty two 31. 40 23. 24 14. sixty 2004 twenty-two. 63 13. 68 12. 82 31. 53 -7. 72 almost eight. 15 4. 86 13. 56 9. 37 four. 06 being unfaithful. 97 a few. 55 five. 56 -0. 43 installment payments on your 25 3. 84 some. 70 being unfaithful. 89 twenty seven. 97 6. 14 2005 9. 73 11. 31 5. 99 37. 86 12. 01 9. forty seven 10. 66 8. 35 7. 69 7. 00 8. 03 4. 98 -7.
52 -16. ninety-seven 8. sixty 4. 70 5. 08 13. thirty five 30. 96 10. twenty four 2006 seventeen. 83 18. 43 doze. 04 30. 22 doze. 84 15. 95 9. 48 14. 08 10. 48 eight. 94 13. 17 eight. 68 5. 02 six. 64 4. 95 several. 44 twenty one. 12 13. 21 twenty one. 65 of sixteen. 74 3 years ago 17. 97 10. 99 22. 37 31. sixty-eight 8. 18 13. 13 8. 90 7. 52 8. 42 16. thirty-three 1 . summer 9. 48 11. 62 16. 57 6. 98 7. 93 15. ninety six 4. 60 19. 84 7. 76 2008 twenty. 99 -3. 04 up to 29. 38 -49. 30 25. 42 -21. 69 -5. 16 -28. 36 -18. 40 -23. 02 doze. 96 7. 57 21. 82 thirty-five. 67 -2. 49 5. 78 -12. 40 -38. 60 -20. 88 -13. 96 2009 -4. 63 16. twenty-eight -11. 28 90. 44 -11. 24 21. dua puluh enam 9. 83 55. 20 27. 32 10. 51 5. 83 8. 32 1 . 41 3. 10 9. 92 6. 55 28. thirty four 69. 94 56. 60 6. 80 2010 18.
46 13. 22 13. 89 twenty-five. 06 12-15. 36 several. 31 6. 38 13. 46 10. 40 your five. 36 14. 42 several. 80 2 . 46 four. 58 -3. 93 a few. 97 9. 30 twenty three. 61 15. 90 -1. 14 2011 6. 30 8. 39 -8. sixty-five -15. 30 4. fifty-one -6. 01 -3. twenty-seven -4. sixty six -5. 28 -2. summer -2. forty five -2. thirty-two -4. eleven -2.
67 -4. nineteen -2. seventy nine Source: Morningstar Hedge Account Database, seen January 2012.
